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NUMBER 6

PROBATE LAW AND THE UNIFORM CODE:
"ONE FOR THE MONEY.. ."
JTJLIAN

R. Kossow*

During the 1970's the new Uniform Probate Code is being considered intensively by state legislatures. Professor Kossow focuses
on three provisions of the Code and examines their common law
roots and the impact the Code qill have on present law.

Little clairvoyance is needed to forecast the significant impact of the
Uniform ProbateCode' within the next several years. In 1969 the Code
was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association. As of Spring 1973, the Code has been adopted in two states2 and
currently is being considered by 21 other state legislatures. 3 By the end
of the decade, the Uniform Probate Code will be to probate law as the
Uniform Commercial Code is to commercial law.

This article will probe three significant areas of the law of decedents'
estates by analysing the current state of the law and then examining
what changes, if any, the Uniform Probate Code makes. The topics
chosen for analysis are (1) testamentary capacity, (2) formalities of execution of a will, and (3) elective share of the surviving spouse. The
*B.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; law
clerk to the Honorable Walter M. Bastian, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1968-69; Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University
Law Center, 1969-1973; Director, Loughran Institute of Land Use and Development;
Visiting Professor of Law, Haile Selassie I University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1973-1974.
1 UNFORM PROBATE CODE (1969).
2ALAsKA STAT. §§ 13.06.005 to 13.36.10D (1972); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-1-101 to 15-7-307
(Cum. Supp. 1972).

3 Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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reason for the selection is that these topics, all fundamental to the law
of decedents' estates, have been altered, respectively, (1) not at all, (2)
moderately, and (3) drastically by the Code and offer useful focal points
for evaluating the law of decedents' estates under the Code.
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

Freedom of testation is the keystone in the arch of the law of wills.
The law, nevertheless, does impose certain constraints on a person's
right to dispose of his property at death. A major limitation to the execution of a valid will is that the testator must possess a minimum mental
capacity. Just as legal standards of mental capacity must be met in order

for a person to be able to enter into a valid contract or to be held responsible for a crime, so is there a legal standard for the mental ability requisite of one who executes a valid will. 4 The primary purpose of this

standard is to assist in the ascertainment of the testator's intent, although
an even more important reason for the standard has been suggested: to
protect society and the family from testamentary acts of mental incompetents. 5
PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW

The standard of mental capacity frequently set forth in the statutes
and cases is that of a "sound mind." 6No short cut should be attempted
in defining the term sound mind. The intricacies of the human mind are
subtle and complex and thus the facts of each separate case must be determinative. Generally, however, a testator is considered to have legally
sufficient mental capacity if he is capable of: (1) discerning the nature
and extent of his property; (2) knowing those persons who would
typically be the recipients of his testamentary beneficence; (3) comprehending the attempted disposition of his property pursuant to a rational
plan;.and (4) understanding of the above criteria in relationship to one
4 The standards are, of course, different; one's ability to negotiate a commercial contract involves considerations quite distinct from those which obtain in determining
one's ability to dispose of his property at death. Thus, a person may have capacity to
execute a valid will, and at the same time be incapable of entering into a valid contract.
Georgia, by statute, expressly states, "[a]n incapacity to contract may coexist with a
capacity to make a will." GA. CODE ANN. § 113-202 (1959); see In re Estate of Paris,
159 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1968); Weihofen, Mental Incompetency to Make a Will, 7 NAT.
Rs.J,89,91 (1967).
5

See Note, Testamentary Capacity in a Nutshell: A Psychiatric Re-Evaluation, 18
STAN. L. REv.1119, 1123 (1966).
6 See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 352 Mass. 766, 225 N.E.2d 590 (1967); Houghton v. Jones,
418 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-160 (1958); IDAHO CODE § 14-301
(1948); UNIFORMa PROBATE CODE § 2-501.
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another. 7 The essence of the capacity requirement is that the testator
have sufficient mental ability to know the nature of his act, of his property and of his relations to the natural objects of his bounty.
It is important that the attorney who must deal with legal problems
of capacity understand the medical profession's approach to this problem. Consequently, an eminent psychiatrist has explained the three elements of the capacity test as follows:
1. Knowledge of the nature of the act means that he must know
that it is his will that he is signing. Evidence that at the time
he was confused and talking incoherently or unable to talk at
all, that he did not seem to recognize the people present, that his
hand had to be guided in signing, and that he died soon afterward, would probably lead a doctor to conclude that he did
not know he was executing a will.
2. Knowledge of the nature and extent of his property calls for
a reasonably accurate comprehension of what he owns. A bequest of $100,000 to his sister Kate and the remainder to his
wife, when his whole estate is not and never has been worth
that much, would indicate that because of psychotic delusions
of grandeur or other reasons he did not know the extent of his
holdings. A specific devise of the old family homestead, which
in fact he had sold ten years before, may lead us to conclude
that senility has so far impaired his memory as to deprive him
of capacity to know the nature and extent of his property.
3. Knowing his relations to the persons who are the natural objects of his bounty requires that he know who they are and
what their legal gr moral claims on him may be. If he insists that
his children are all dead, or that the daughter who has been
caring for him is not his daughter but an imposter, he is presumably incompetent under this third element in the criteria.8
Thus, the two most pertinent questions are whether the participant understood the nature of the act and whether he was aware of his duties
in connection with that act.9
7 See, e.g., In re Fritchi's Estate, 60 Cal. 2d 357, 384 P.2d 656, 33 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1963);
Tarricone v. Cummings, 340 Mass. 758, 166 N.E.2d 737 (1960); In re Armijo's Will,

57 N.M. 649, 261 P.2d 833 (1953); In re Estate of Morton, 428 P.2d 725 (Wyo. 1967);
W. BowE & D. PARKER, I PAGE oN aTm LAw OF WiLs § 12.21, at 608 (2d ed. 1960)

[hereinafter cited as W. BowE & D. PARKER); Weihofen, supra note 4, at 89; Note,
supra note 5, at 1124.
8 R. ALrnx, E. FsrER, & H. WEmoFEN, MENTAL ImPAxmMENT AND LEGAL INcoMPENCY 285 (1968).
9

See Freedman, Forensic Psychiatry, in COMPREHENSIVE Tx'moon OF PSYCMATRY

§ 48.1, at 1602 (A. Freedman & H. Kaplan eds. 1972).
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The testator's mental ability is the key to the test. Lack of knowledge
of the extent of his property, or the formation of an apparently irrational
plan, are not per se determinative of lack of capacity." The will of a
testator who possesses capacity will not be invalidated even though its
terms are manifestly unnatural or unjust." Conversely, natural and just
provisions contained in the will of a person of unsound mind will not
2
be given effect.'
Mental incapacity, then, is a factual conclusion determined by the
testator's inability to meet the previously discussed threshold requirements. In turn tis inability emanates from the condition of the testator's
mind. Consequently, courts must grapple with legal classifications of
extremely complex medical situations. Nevertheless, for legal purposes,
an inability to execute a will can be thought of as being the result of
either a deficient or deranged mind. 1 Mental deficiency is typically the
product of organic brain disease, while mental derangement generally
arises from some mental illness, as in the case of insane delusion." An
individual may possess both conditions.
The deficient mind is typical of the mental condition of a person incapable of satisfying all or part of the described standard-knowing his
next of kin, the nature of his property and how he wishes to dispose of
it.' Although deficiency is usually congenital, the condition also may
result from age, disease, or injury. 6 A person of very low intelligence,
even one medically classified as a moron, may have enough mental ability
to rise above the legal category of the deficient mind, but it is doubtful
if one classified as an idiot or an imbecile could have testamentary capaci10 Emerich v. Arendt, 179 Ark. 186, 14 S.W.2d 547 (1929).
11 See In re Estate of Gecht, 165 Cal. App. 2d 431, 331'P.2d 1019 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
In re Estate of Tobias, 192 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1966); In re Honigman's Will, 8 N.Y.2d 244,
168 N.E.2d 676, 679, 203 N.Y.S.2d 859, 865 (1960) (Fuld, J., dissenting). But see In re
Alexander's Estate, 11 Cal. App. 1, 295 P. 53 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931). Nonetheless, it has
been suggested that courts unconsciously consider the fairness of the disposition. See
Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 YAMu
L.J. 271, 311- (1944). Courts carefully will examine a will that disinherits the testator's
immediate family. See Degenhardt v. Joplin, 239 S.W. 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Epstein, Testamentary Capacity, Reasonableness and Family Maintenance, 35 TEMP. L.Q.
231 (1962); Laube, The Right of a Testator to PauperizeHelpless Dependents, 13 CoNaNLL
L.R xv. 559 (1928).
22 Shirley v. Ezell, 180 Ala. 352, 60 So. 905 (1913).
Is See T. AnaTNSON, HnAm ooK oF nm LAW OF Wu s 234 (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter
cited as T. AnuNsoNl; 1 W. BowE & D. PAREa § 12.25, at 622.
14T. ATIrNsoN 234; W. BowE & D. PARKER § 12.25, at 622. The two categories are not
mutually exclusive for one individual possibly may possess both types of mental conditons.
15See Note, supra note 5, at 1135. See generally 1 W. Bow &D. PARKER § 12.25.
16 Green, supra note 11, at 272.
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ty.17 Subnormal intellectual function now is encompassed medically under the term mental retardation, which is classified according to severity8
in five categories: borderline, mild, moderate, severe, and profound.'
Persons diagnosed as having borderline mental retardation probably
would have capacity; those suffering from mild or moderate mental retardation would be questionable; and those with severe or profound
mental retardation in all probability would not have capacity."
Age is often the most significant, and possibly the most vexatious
factor. Old age frequently leads to senile psychosis, 20 which classically
is manifested by loss of memory, judgment, efficiency, consciousness, and
orientation, and by possible delusions and hallucinations. 21 The senile
testator may be unable to concentrate sufficiently to form a testamentary
plan, or he may be forgetful of members of his immediate family. The
process of mental enfeeblement is very slow, 22 and the decision whether
the testator had capacity at the moment the will was executed is often
extremely difficult. A large percentage of testators execute wills when
they are quite elderly and at a time when their minds no longer function
as well as in past years, but the courts wisely have been reluctant to
23
conclude that elderly people are incapable of validly executing wills.
1"See In re Estate of Glesenkamp, 378 Pa. 635, 107 A.2d 731 (1954) (adult with intelligence of five year old lacked testamentary capacity); T. ATKINSON 235; 1 W. BowF
& D. PARuuR § 12.25, at 622-23.
IsAP.A.DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MaurNr. DIsoRDERS 14 (2d ed. 1968);
Cytryn & Lourie, Mental Retardation,in CovREmNSr TErooK Or PsYcHIATRY § 22.1,
at 820 (A. Freeman & H. Kaplan eds. 1972). Diagnostic classification of mental retardation relates to intelligence quotient approximately as follows: borderline-70-84 I.Q.;
mild-55-69 I.Q.; moderate--40-54 I.Q.; severe-25-39 I.Q.;-profound-under 24 I.Q. Id.
19 See 1 W. BowE & D. PARKER § 12.25, at 622-23.
20 The most common types of senile psychosis are senile brain disease (dementia) and
cerebral arteriosclerosis. It is estimated that 80 percent of mental health patients over
age 65 suffer from either senile brain disease or arteriosclerotic brain disease. Busse,
Brain Syndromes Associated with Disturbances in Metabolism, Growth, and Nutrition,
in CoMPREHENSIVE TExaOOK oF PSYCHIATRY § 19.2, at 727 (A. Freedman & H. Kaplan
eds. 1972).
21 See Rothschild, Senile Psychoses and Psychoses with Cerebral Arteriosclerosis, in
MENTAL DISORDERS IN LATER LimE 299-301, 319-20 (2d ed. 0. Kaplan 1956).
22 The individual afflicted with senile brain disease may become psychotic imperceptibly
so that it is almost impossible to date on the onset of the disease. Id. at 299. However,
cerebral arteriosclerosis tends to have an abrupt onset, usually taking the form of a
sudden attack of confusion. Id. at 319; Busse, supra note 19, § 19.2, at 722; Smith & Hager,
The Senile Testator: Medicolegal Aspects of Competency, 13 CLtv.-MAR. L. REv. 397,
408-09 (1964).
23 See McCrocklings' Adm. v. Lee, 247 Ky. 31, 56 S.W.2d 564 (1933). "[C]ourts will
guard jealously this right to make wills in the aged and infirm." Waggener v. General
Ass'n of Baptists in Ky., 306 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Ky. 1957). Even one afflicted with senile
dementia or arteriosclerosis may be capable of executing a will, provided he meets the
fundamental requirements. See, e.g., In re Dunson's Estate, 141 So. 2d 601 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
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There is strong presumption that the testator has capacity, 24 and those
who contest the will on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity must
meet a substantial burden of proof.

25

Persons with deranged minds usually possess the mental capability
necessary to meet most of the requirements previously delineated, but
because of mental illness, are unable to form a rational dispositive
scheme.26 Such persons are often said to be suffering from an insane delusion, which may result from paranoia, schizophrenia or any one of
several other possible causes. The insane delusion merits special attention
because unless the delusion directly affects the contents of the will, the
testator will not lack capacity. 27 In addition, where the issue is insane

delusion rather than general lack of mental capacity, the issue must be
28

specially tried.

Although difficult to define, an insane delusion consists of a belief in
the existence of certain facts which in reality do not exist,2 9 and which is
held against all evidence, reason, or probability.30 Additionally, there
must be conduct by the believer on the assumption of the verity of the
delusion.21 However, the definition is of dubious value in any particular
case. More important is the circumstantial flavor of each case combined
App. 1962); Leventhal v. Baumgartner, 207 Ga. 412, 61 S.E.2d 810 (1950); In re Frorup's
Will, 10 Misc. 2d 432, 172 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Surrogate's Ct. 1958).
24 Even a prior adjudication of incompetency and placement under guardianship is
not conclusive. See Hermann v. Crossen, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 322, 326-27, 160 N.E.2d 404,
409 (Ohio App. 1959). But the fact that the testator was under guardianship may raise
a rebuttable presumption of incapacity. See In re Armijo's Will, 57 N.M. 649, 655, 261
P.2d 833, 837 (1953). A judicial order of commitment has even less effect than an
adjudication of incompetency. Weihofen, supra note 4, at 94.
25 See, e.g., In re Estate of Springer, 252 Iowa 1220, 110 N.W.2d 380 (1961); Friedel
v. Blechman, 250 Md. 270, 242 A.2d 103 (1968); Lewis v. McCullough, 413 S.W.2d 499
(Mo. 1967); McGrail v. Schmitt, 357 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. 1962); Wood v. Wood, 25 Wyo.
26, 164 P. 844 (1917).
26T. ATKINSON 234. The delusion may affect testamentary capacity in several ways:
it affects the instrument itself if, for example, the testator believes that he is being forced
to sign it; the testator may be deluded as to the extent of his property; delusions often
deal with the testator's relationship to his family, such as when he believes he is being
poisoned. See Weihofen, supra note 4, at 101.
27
See, e.g., Malone v. Malone, 26 Ii. App. 2d 291, 167 N.E. 2d 703 (1960) (delusions
must affect execution); In re Duross' Will, 395 Pa. 492, 150 A.2d 710 (1959) (delusion
must have caused testator to make an entirely different will); Eason v. Eason, 203 Va.
246, 123 S.E.2d 361 (1962) (contestant must show that the delusion was insane and that
the will was the product thereof). Even hallucinations will not destroy testamentary
capacity unless they directly affect the disposition. See In re Morgan's Estate, 225 Cal.
App. 2d 156. 37 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1964).
2
8See Lindley v. Lindley, 384 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1964).
29 In re Sommerville's Estate, 106 Pa. 207, 177 A.2d 496 (1962).
30 In re Putnam's Estate, 1 Cal. 2d 162, 34 P.2d 148 (1934).
3' See Havird v. Schissell, 252 S.C. 404, 166 S.E.2d 801 (1969).
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with what a consensus of society thinks is an irrational belief. For example, belief in a Supreme Being is obviously not an insane delusion.
However, if an individual believed that he was the Supreme Being, this
probably would be held to be an insane delusion. If that person, based
on that belief, disinherited his immediate family and left all of his property to his "disciples," his will probably would be vitiated for lack of
capacity. If, on the other hand, he left his property to his wife and children, he may well not lack capacity because his delusion arguably did
not affect the contents of his will. The delusion must affect the disposition.
Precedent may be of some limited value in determining what constitutes32an insane delusion. Uncommon religious beliefs, faith in spiritualism, or mere eccentricities 3 have not been considered delusions vitiating capacity. Factually, many cases have involved the testator's relationship to his family. 34 Since the line between mistaken belief and insane delusion is an amorphous one, the circumstances of the individual
case are determinative. The testator who predicates his will upon a belief in his wife's infidelity or his child's illegitimacy may well be mistaken rather than deluded. Often, the difference is whether or not there
is any evidence to support the testator's belief. If so, such a belief, even
if false, will not constitute an insane delusion. 5 To constitute a finding
of incapacity, the false belief must be one that is adhered to against all
evidence or reason. 36
3

2 See In re Elston's Estate, 262 P.2d 148, 151 (Okla. 1953). But see In re City Nat'l

Bank & Trust Co., 144 A.2d 338 (1958) (testator believed she was communicating with
a fictitious person via a ouija board). However, if the testator believed that the disposition of his property was spiritually dictated, the contents of the will are affected and
the will is invalid. See In re Sandman's Estate, 121 Cal. App. 9, 13, 8 P.2d 499, 500 (Dist.
Ct.App. 1932).
33 See Quellmalz v. First Nat'l Bank, 16 IlM. 2d 546, 158 N.E.2d 591 (1959); Ennis v.
Illinois State Bank, 111 II. App. 2d 71, 248 N.E.2d 534 (1969). However, the cumulative
effect of many eccentric acts may be evidence of incapacity. See Green, supra note 11,
at 277.
34 See, e.g., McGrail v. Schmitt, 357 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. 1962) (testator's belief that his
daughter was illegitimate); In re Honigman's Will, 8 N.Y.2d 244, 168 N.E.2d 676, 203
N.Y.S.2d 859 (1960) (testator believed wife of 40 years unfaithful); In re Riemer, 2
Wis. 2d 16, 85 N.W.2d 804 (1957) (testator believed husband planned to kill her).
35 In re Coffin's Estate, 103 NJ. Super. 1, 246 A. 2d 489 (1968).
36
In re Honigman's Will, 8 N.Y.2d 244, 168 N.E.2d 676, 203 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1960).
But see In re Wicker's Will, 15 Wis. 2d 86, 112 N.W.2d 137 (1967) (insane delusion
may exist even if there is some evidence from which testator might have based his judgment).
Some commentators maintain that the law of testamentary capacity is too rigid and
that the legal definition of delusion has not kept pace with modem psychiatry.
Where there is evidence, however slight, that some factual basis existed,
the courts are inclined to say that delusion was not present. Hardly any
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Another variable in the question of mental capacity is the element of
time. The rule is that the testator must have capacity at the time he executes the will.3 7 As long as the testator possesses sufficient mental ability
when he makes the will, incapacity before or after the time of execution
is not determinative,38 except for possible evidentiary effects.39 Conversely the will is invalid when the testator could normally meet the required standards but at the time of execution is temporarily incapacitated. This situation typically occurs where the testator is so highly
intoxicated or so greatly under the influence of drugs that, at the time,
he cannot satisfy the capacity requirements. 40 Finally a will, if made
during a period of incapacity, may be validly republished by codicil at
a later time when the testator possesses sufficient mental ability to satisfy
standards of testamentary capacity. 41
The elements of testamentary capacity not only include mental capacity but also the testator's age. In all jurisdictions, the age required
interpretation could be further from the facts as the psychiatrist sees them.
It is only in the most dilapidated psychotic that delusion is not based to
some extent on actual events.
The psychiatrist thus finds himself considerably limited by the legal concept of delusion and, furthermore, by the general attitude of the law that
a delusion, if granted by the law to exist, must be shown to have a fairly
.obvious relation to the subject of the will itself. The law relating to testamentary, capacity . . . would certainly benefit . . . by the application of
modem knowledge regarding mental functioning.
Overholser, Major Principles of Forensic Psychiatry, in 2 AMERiCAN HANDBOOK ov
PsYcHATRY 1890 (S. Arieti ed. 1959).
37 See, e.g., In re Stitt, 93 Ariz. 302, 380 P.2d 601 (1963); Estate of Goetz, 253 Cal.
App. 2d 107, 61 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967); In re Will of McGough, 222 So.
2d 673 (Miss. 1969).
3
BSee, e.g., In re Jamison's Estate, 249 P.2d 859 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Legeune
v. Succession of Duplechin, 260 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 1972); In re Cook's Estate, 231
Ore. 133, 372 P.2d 520 (1962); Weihofen, supra note 4, at 102-03. Whether the testator
actually was lucid is a question of fact. See 1 W. Bown & D. PARKER § 12.36, at 643.
39 See Rogers v. Crisp, 241 Ark. 68, 406 S.W.2d 329 (1966). An adjudication of incompetency shortly after execution of the will is admissible into evidence on the issue
of capacity, but is not conclusive. See Estate of Wolf, 174 Cal. App. 2d 144, 344 P.2d 37
(Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
4
oSee In re Kells Estate, 190 Cal. App. 2d 286, 11 Cal. Rptr. 913 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961)
(testator drunk when will was executed); In re Estate of Cole, 205 So. 2d 554 (Fla. App.
1968) (drugs). To invalidate the will the testator must be so incapacitated by the drug
or alcohol that he cannot meet the standard of testamentary capacity. Smith & Hager,
supra note 22, at 422; see In re Rhode's Estate, 436 S.W.2d 429, 436-37 (Tenn. 1968);
In re Kraft's Estate, 374 P.2d 413 (Alas. 1962). Chronic alcoholism or drug addiction also
may result in an actual mental deterioration. See, e.g., Price v. Marshall, 255 Ala. 447,
52 So. 2d 149 (1951) (drugs); Frank's Ex'r v. Bates, 278 Ky. 337, 128 S.W.2d 739 (1939)
(drugs); McGrail v. Schmitt, 357 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. 1962) (alcohol).
41 See, e.g., Brown v. Riggin, 94 IlM. 560 (1880); Barnes v. Phillips, 184 Ind. 415, 111
N.E. 419 (1916); De Marco v. D'Errico, 87 R.I. 117, 138 A.2d 830 (1958).
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for testamentary capacity is fixed by the statute and only persons of the
requisite age may validly dispose of property by will. 42 The clearly

established trend is to set the minimum testamentary age at 18 for both
real and personal property.43 Today, about half of the states have adopted
this position, as has the Uniform Probate Code. 4 Many other states require the testator to be twenty-one years of age; however, in most of
these jurisdictions, the age minimum is relaxed in certain circumstances.45
No state imposes a maximum age limit.
By recognizing the signs of possible insane delusions or general lack
of testamentary capacity, the lawyer can play a crucial role in avoiding
litigation.' 6 Particularly in the case of an aged testator, the lawyer should
prepare for a will contest by those persons who would benefit if the will
were declared invalid. Commentators have recommended that anyone
over 65 years old should undergo a physical and psychiatric examination before executing a will. 7 Similarly, if the testator is retarded in48
telligence tests may also be necessary.
MENTAL CAPACITY AND THE CODE

Section 2-501 of the Uniform ProbateCode merely states that, "[a]ny
person 18 or more years of age who is of sound mind may make a
will." 19 Nothing in the comments sheds any'light on what constitutes
a sound mind. Nothing indicates that the drafters of the Code even con42 1 W. BowE & D. PARKER § 12.8, at 581.
43

See, e.g, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-160 (1958); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 4-101

(Supp. 1969); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-1 (Supp. 1969).
44
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-501.
45

See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.1(b) (Supp. 1970)' (persons eighteen or older who
are married or in the armed forces); S.C. CODE § 19-201 (1962) (married and above 18).
Some statutes simply require the testator to be of "full age" or "of majority." See, e.g.,
IOWA CODE ANN. § 599.1 (1950); MAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-601 (1964); MAss. ANN. LAWS

ch. 191, § 1 (1969). The full age requirement generally means age 21, but this may be
relaxed if the testator meets other criteria. See IowA CODE ANN. § 599.1 (1950) (full
age means 21 or married). A small number of states also distinguish between the testamentary age necessary for the disposition of realty and personalty. ALA. CODE tit. 61,
§9 1, 2 (1960) (21 for realty; 18 for personalty).
46
See In re Cory's Estate, 169 N.W.2d 837 (Iowa 1969) (attorney 'prepared for will
contest on issue of testamentary capacity). Some courts have held that a lawyer has a
duty to determine that the testator has testamentary capacity. See Gilmer v. Brown,
186 Va. 630, 44 S.E.2d 46 (1947).
47 Smith & Hager, supra note 22, at 428, 430; Weihofen, supra note 4, at 95. The technique has been criticized because the mere fact that such an examination occurred may
be used as evidence of incapacity by the contestants of the will. Smith & Hager, supra
note 22.
48 Weihofen, supra note 4, at 97.
49

UNIFORI

PROBATE CODE § 2-501.
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sidered changing or amplifying the traditional requirements. A tremendous opportunity has been lost by the failure to give needed guidance. In
defense of the Code one hardly could imagine a more difficult task than
articulating a new standard of testamentary capacity. But even the minimal standards of today sometimes are applied loosely or even misapplied by trial and appellate courts. At the very least the Code, if not in
the text then certainly in the comments, could have influenced courts
everywhere to forcefully apply the present minimal standards of mental
capacity.
There is demonstrable need for such influence. The existing law of
testamentary capacity has become increasingly rigid. Both the conceptual approaches to the problem and the legal terminology of capacity
have crystallized. Such fossilization is particularly undesirable in an age
of significant medical advancements in the understanding of the human
mind.
Moreover, appellate courts, while declaring that they are limited by
the clearly erroneous rule in the supervision of cases that are principally
factual determinations, 50 have failed to require trial courts to apply strictly the standard of testamentary capacity to the facts in each case. Thus
trial courts can obfuscate their decisions and thereby are permitted to
make determinations occasionally based on "gastronomical jurisprudence" and often supported by no more than a modicum of evidence.
The following cases will serve, by way of illustration, to demonstrate
that courts often fail to apply the criteria of capacity to the facts in any
meaningful way.
Many Duplechin, the testator in Lejeune v. Succession of Duplechin,51 was described as mentally unsound. He had set fire to his bedding both while institutionalized at a tuberculosis hospital and while
living in his mobile home.52 The only physician testifying at trial stated
that the testator was suffering from senility and that lucid periods were
not probable. Testimony at trial described the testator as being miserly,
talking of cattle which he no longer owned as though he still had them,
having no control of his bodily functions, and crying frequently. Despite the record, the Court of Appeal of Louisiana upheld the trial
court's admission of Duplechin's will to probate. Although evidence
was introduced which would support a finding of capacity, there is no
discussion in the court's opinion whether the testator knew the natural
50See Estate of Gecht, 165 Cal. App. 2d 431, 442, 331 P.2d 1019, 1026 (Dist. Ct. App.
1958); Lejeune v. Succession of Duplechin, 260 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 1972).
51260 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 1972).
52 Id. at 38.
53Id.at 39.
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objects of his bounty. Moreover, the court did not consider the fact
that a large portion of Many's estate was not contained in his will and
it is therefore questionable whether he knew the nature and extent of
his property. Instead of examining these criteria, the court simply concluded that since there was some evidence of capacity, the trial judge
committed no manifest error in his factual conclusions and therefore
54
his judgment was affirmed.
Elnora Duncan Brown was 81 years old when she died in 1968.11 She
had suffered a severe cerebral hemorrhage and was hospitalized in a
psychotic state. Yet only 18 days following her release from the hospital, Mrs. Brown executed her will.5 6 A physician described Mrs.

Brown's condition as poor. She was bedridden, her mental functioning
was poor, and she was essentially helpless.5 7 The scrivener testified for
the proponents of the will that the testator wished to make a will and
understood what was going on.58 Again the court did not analyze

whether the decedent knew the nature and extent of her property or
was aware of the natural objects of her bounty. A more careful application of proper standards was called for in such a case.
Though constrained by the clearly erroneous rule, not all appellate
courts are wary of questioning the decision of a trial court. In Paskyn
v. Mesich, 9 an Alaska trial court found the decedent competent. A
guardian appointed for the testator testified that Mesich did not understand anything even when spoken to in his native tongue, that he would
sign his own death certificate, and that "he didn't know what was happening anymore than the man in the moon." 60 An attorney who had
54 Id.

55 Succession of Brown, 251 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 1971).
56 Id. at 466.
57 Id. at 467-468. As the court stated, "[a) fair analysis of Dr. Faust's testimony as a
whole is that he considered that decedent did not possess testamentary capacity." Id.
at 468.
58 Id. at 468. These cases are illustrative of countless others. In the following cases,
despite substantial evidence of incapacity, the validity of the will was upheld, without
considering whether the testator understood the nature and extent of his property,
natural objects of his benefice, or had a rational testamentary plan. See Holladay v.
Holladay, 294 Ky. 540, 172 S.W.2d 36 (1943) (testator thought it was safer to sit under
a tree rather than in the house during electrical storms; stood in the center of the
road at midnight and required motorists to go around him; bathed in a hog wallow);
In re Hall's Will, 252 N.C. 70, 113 S.E.2d 1 (1960) (testator could not manage own
affairs; her mind wandered; she had an affair with a young man; imagined kmocking at
the door, telephone ringing, and wiretapping; did not understand value of property;
said if she had a gun she would "go out killing"); cf. In re Estate of Teel, 483 P.2d 603
(Ariz. 1971) (testator with a mental age of 12 found competent).
59 455 P.2d 229 (Alas. 1969).
60 Id. at 236.
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done legal work for Mesich stated that he never could get a lucid story
from him and that his mind was so confused that he could not grasp
the significance of simple questions. Mesich did not recognize anybody
and would respond only with a hello or a grunt upon encountering
someone he knew. He was described as a vegetable. 61 A physician testified that Mesich could not supply him with a satisfactory history of
himself, that he had a definite pathology in his brain resulting from a
head injury, and that his memory for old events was good but for recent events his memory was poor. 62 The Supreme Court of Alaska concluded that the trial court had not given adequate weight to the depositions of witnesses who did not appear at trial. Since the judgment of
the trial court rested primarily on written testimony, the appellate court
did not hesitate to rule that the trial judge was clearly erroneous. 63 However, even the Alaska court only recited the test and failed to relate the
testimony directly to the standards for capacity.
As these cases demonstrate, appellate courts have for too long failed
to insure strict application of the standards of testamentary capacity.
The result has been confusion and misapplication. The existing standards are minimal, and the Uniform Probate Code has not augmented
them. However, both the existing standard and the Code formula are
capable of more consistent application than they now receive. States
which adopt the Uniform Probate Code should consider inserting the
criteria for testamentary capacity in the comments to section 2-501 to
assure that those standards will be applied.
61 Id. at 236-37.
62 Id.at 237.
63 Id. at 240. See also In re Morgan's Estate, 225 Cal. App. 2d 156, 37 Cal. Rptr. 160
(Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (testator saw snakes and worms in her bed, pigs on the floor, and

elephants on ceiling; bequeathed residue of her estate to a sister who was dead when
the will was executed; court concluded she did not understand the extent of her
property or have a rational testamentary plan); In re Sanderson, 171 Cal. App. 2d 651,
341 P.2d 358 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (testator left entire estate to religious institutions;
incapable of conversing normally; started fires in garden without reason; had "religious
mania;" but rationally discussed his property and relatives with scrivener so court concluded that eccentricities did not bear on capacity); Webster v. Larmore, - Md. -,
-,
299 A.2d 814 (1973) (testator locked herself out of her house, lost bank book, believed people were stealing her money; doctor testified that she was incompetent due
to arteriosclerosis; but she understood the people who should be objects of her bounty
and her testamentary plan was consonant with her assets); In re Johnson's Estate, 308
Mich. 366, 13 N.W.2d 852 (1944) (decedents house filled with filth, refuse, and animal
droppings; drowned a litter of kittens and burned them in the stove; court applied
criteria and found capacity); McCrail v. Schmitt, 357 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. 1962) (testator
doubted daughter's legitimacy; dressed in women's clothes; habitual alcoholic for 25
years; affirmed jury verdict that he did not satisfy criteria for capacity).
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FORMALITIES OF TESTAMENTARY TRANSFER:
ORDINARY, FORMAL WILLS AND HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS

Formalities of transfer have developed which buttress the reliability
of an intended testamentary transfer and assure freedom of testation.
Such formalities assist in the determination that a testamentary transfer
was competently and freely made and that the expressed dispositions
64
are an accurate reflection of the testator's intent.
The formal requirements of testamentary transfer relevant to contemporary law began with the passage of the English Statute of Wills
in 154065, wherein transfer of land by wills was permitted as long as
the will was in writing. In 1677, the Statute of Frauds" promulgated
formalities not unlike present day requirements-devises of land had to
be written, signed by the testator and attested in his presence by "three
or four credible" witnesses.17 The English Wills Act of 183768 removed,
inter alia, any discrepancies between real and personal property in testamentary dispositions. Today every state has a statute governing the formal requirements for the valid execution of a will. Modern statutes
substantially are patterned after the Statute of Frauds and the English
Wills Act. Compliance with these statutory requirements is the sine
qua non of testamentary transfers.69
PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW

Formal Written Wills.
With regard to formalities of transfer, little variation exists among American statutes. 70 However, it
must be emphasized that even slight differences can be critical in any
given situation. Nevertheless, a consensus of statutes contains the following minimum requirements for the valid execution of an ordinary
64Cases frequently indicate that the purpose of statutory formalities is to guard
against mistakes, impositions, undue influence, fraud and deception. See, e.g., Panousseris'
Will, 2 Storey 21, 151 A.2d 518, 527 (Del. Orphans Ct. 1959); Howard v. Gunter, 215
So. 2d 222, 224 (La. App. 1968); Wilson v. Polite, 218 So. 2d 843, 849 (Miss. 1969).
65 32 Hen. 8, c.1 (1540).
66 29 Car. 2, c.3, § V (1677).
67

Id.

68 7 Win. 4 and 1 Vict., c.26, § III (1837).
69 See Wilson v. Polite, 218 So. 2d 843,

849 (Miss. 1969) (requisite to valid will is
execution as prescribed by statute). Often, however, absolute compliance with requisites
of a statute pertaining to the execution of the will is not required. See Hobbs v. Mahoney, 478 P.2d 956 (Okla. 1971).
70 The discussion of formalities of testamentary transfer is inapplicable to wills executed in Louisiana which has unique decedents estates law. See LA. Cirv. Coos AN-N.
arts. 1577-78 (West 1952) (nuncupative will by public act which is a will dictated to a
notary public); id. art. 1581 (nuncupative will under private signature); id. art. 1584
(mystic will-testator presents closed and sealed will to notary and witnesses).
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will: that the will be in writing; that the testator sign the will, or that
another person sign in behalf of the testator but under the latter's direction and in his presence; and that the will be attested by at least two
competent witnesses who sign in the presence of the testator." A substantial number of states have included some of the following variations: that the testator sign at the end of the will; that the testator sign
in the presence of the witnesses or, alternatively, that the testator acknowledge his previously signed signature to the witnesses; that the testator declare that the instrument being executed is his will; that the witnesses be requested by the testator to sign the will; and that the witnesses
72
sign in the presence of each other.
The first formality of testamentary transfer is the requirement that
the will must be in writing, which is the rule in every state and is applicable to all testaments except nuncupative and military wills. 73 Thus,
oral testamentary dispositions generally are invalid.74 Judicial decisions
have interpreted the writing requirement liberally. Typewritten wills,7"
as well as those done by pen or pencil,7 6 or by filling in the blanks of a
printed legal form, 77 are common and acceptable. Law review articles
and other periodicals contain accounts of cases accepting wills executed
on a tractor fender, 78 a nurse's petticoat, 79 a stepladder rung,80 a matchbox, 8' a sailor's brass identity disk, 2 and even on an eggshell.83
The question arises, at least in theory, of modern technological substitutes for a writing. Devices such as movies, video tapes, phonographs
and tape recordings and computers, while perhaps being as reliable as
71

See appendix, p. 1394 infra.

721d.

73Id. Some states permit oral nuncupative and military wills, which are valid only
in certain limited situations. However, section 2-502 of the Uniform Probate Code requires all wills to be in writing and therefore eliminates the use of oral wills. Consequently, a detailed consideration of the problems of oral testaments is beyond the scope
of this artice.
74
Thum v. McAra, 374 Mch. 22, 130 N.W.2d 887 (1964); see note 73 supra.
75
See Hopson v. Ewing, 353 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1962).
76 See Smith v. Beales, 33 Pa. Super. 570 (1907).
77
See Sears v. Sears, 77 Ohio St. 104, 82 N.E. 1067 (1907).
78
Note, 26 CAN. B. REv. 1242 (1948) (when the will was probated, the part of the
tractor fender containing the will was required to be filed with the court).
79 Sellers, Strange Wills, 28 J. CGuM. L.C. & P.S. 106, 109 (1937); see Pelkey v. Hodge,
112 Cal. App. 424, 296 P. 908 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
s0 Sellers, supra note 79, at 108 (probate denied because will found to be a forgery).
sl Id. (probate denied because will found to be a forgery).
82 66 SoL. J. 638 (1922).
3
8S
Hodson v. Barnes, 43 TL.R. 71, 162 L.T. 453 (1926), noted in 3 CAasB. L.J. 103
(1927) and 27 COLuM. L. REv. 478 (1927) (probate denied because dispositive intent
not shown). See also, Million, Wills: Witty, Witless, and Wicked, 7 WAYNm L. REv. 335

(1960).
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traditional methods of executing a will, simply would not constitute
compliance with statutory requirements as these formalities presently
are envisaged. However, technological substitutes should not be precluded automatically although legislative blessings would be necessary
in order to authorize such devices.8 4 Regretfully, the Uniform Probate
Code is silent on this matter.
The next essential formality is the universal requirement that ordinary
wills must be signed by the testator. There has been a lot of litigation
as to what constitutes a legally sufficient signing. Courts have concluded
that almost anything that is intended by the testator to authenticate the
will by serving as his complete signature is sufficient. 85 Thus, cases have
upheld the validity of wills where the testator signed by using his initials,86 his nickname, 8 his given name,18 or his familial relationship to
the legatees8 9 One case sanctioned a will in which the testator signed
by using his fingerprint; the court also recognized the general rule that
a signature, if intended as such, may be printed, lithographed, or typewritten.90 Illegible 9l or misspelled 2 signatures are acceptable, as is the
testator's mark or cross. 93
Fourteen states require that the testator sign at the end of the will,
while one state reaches that same result by declaring that the will must
be subscribed by the testator. 94 Such seemingly clear language has generated a surprising amount of litigation. In states where signature at the
end is required, failure to do so vitiates the will.95 However the rule
that any material provisions written below the signature have the effect
84 There have been at least two reported instances of wills being made wtih the use
of a phonograph. The attorney who acted as a witness for one of the wills stated that
a phonographic will would allow the judge to tell whether the testator was strong or
weak from the tone of his voice as well as aiding the determination of mental competency by means of the testator's fluency or lack of fluency. In each instance, however, it
was recognized that for the wills to be valid applicable state statutes would have to be
amended to authorize such wills. See 27 CASE & CoM. 1263 (1921).
85 See Foster v. Tanner, 221 Ga. 402, 144 S.E.2d 775 (1965).
86In re Shoemaker's Estate, 47 Pa. D. & C. 337, 53 Dauph. Co. 324 (1943).
87 In re Button's Estate, 209 Cal. 325, 287 P. 964 (1930).
88 Succession of Cordaro, 126 So. 2d 809 (La. App. 1961).
89 In re Guinane's Estate, 65 Ill. App. 2d 193, 213 N.E.2d 30 (1965) ("Aunt Margaret");
In re Kling's Estate, 12 Pa. D. & C. 2d 588 (1956) ("Pop").
90 In re Romaniw's Will, 163 Misc. 481, 296 N.Y.S. 925 (1937).
91
In re Iverson's Estate, 39 Wyo. 482, 273 P. 684 (1929).
92 Boone v. Boone, 114 Ark. 69, 169 S.W. 779 (1914).
93
In re McIntyre's Estate, 335 Mich. 238, 94 N.W.2d 208 (1959). A mark is sufficient
even if the testator is not illiterate. Quimby v. Greenhawk, 166 Md. 335, 171 A. 59
(1934); cf. Burns v. Dunn, 340 Mass. 526, 165 N.E.2d 129 (1960).
94 See appendix, p. 1394 infra.
95
In re Estate of Knupp, 428 Pa. 409, 235 A.2d 585 (1967).'
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of invalidating the wil96 is inapplicable to an attestation clause or other
purely formal language." Writing below the signature is to be distinguished from the situation where language is added to a will at some
time after the completed act of execution. Such language is simply of
no effect, but does not invalidate an otherwise acceptable will 0 In the
majority of states there is no requirement of a signing at the end. If the
writing of the testator's name was intended to be his signature, its placement on the document is immaterial.99
Most states permit another person to sign in behalf of the testator if
done under the testator's direction and in his presence.' 9 In this situation, ten statutes require that the person signing for the testator also
sign his own name. 01'
All states require that either the entire will or the testator's signature

be authenticated which can always be accomplished by the testator's
signing in the presence of the witnesses. 12 Alternatively, the requirement of authentication is satisfied in many states by the testator's acknowledgment of his signature. 0 3 Acknowledgment by the testator
is his act of showing the will to the witnesses and stating to them that

the signature signed previously out of their presence is, in fact, his.'04
In several states the concept of acknowledgment refers to an alternative method of authenticating the entire will, rather than just the testator's signature. Here, acknowledgment signifies an act or statement by
the testator to the witnesses that the instrument in question is intended
to be his will and to have legal force and effect.' 05 Generally in these
states the witnesses need not see the testator's signature nor is itnecessary
96

1n re Begun's Will, 123 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sur. Ct. 1953) (rule applied here to a holographic vill). New York and several other states have alleviated the difficulty of this
rule by providing in their statutes that matter following the signature shall be given
no effect and not invalidate the will. N.Y. EsrATEs, POWERS AND TRUSrs LAW § 3-2.1
(McKinney 1967).
97
1n re Mackris' Estate, 124 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sur. Ct. 1953). See Pfahl v. Pfahl, 39 Ohio
App. 2d 348, 225 N.E.2d 305 (P. Ct. 1967).
98 Parrott v. Parrott's Adm'x., 270 Ky. 544, 110 S.W.2d 272 (1937).
99
See Plemons v. Tarpey, 262 Ala. 209, 78 So. 2d 385 (1955); appendix, p. 139+ itra.
10 0
See appendix, p. 1394 infra.
l1 See id. However, seven of these statutes also provide that noncompliance with this
requirement does not affect the validity of the will. Id.
102 See id.
103 Two states do not allow acknowledgment, but it is an acceptable alternative in all
of the other states. See id.
104Parkinson v. Artley, 93 Idaho 66, 455 P.2d 310 (1969); In re Dunham, 334 Mass.
282, 134 N.E.2d 915 (1956). Acknowledgment may not be effective unless the witnesses
had an opportunity to see the testator's signature. Wheat v. Wheat, 156 Conn. 575, 584,
244 A.2d 359, 364 (1968).
105 In re Barry's Will, 219 Ill.
391, 76 N.E. 577 (1905); see Conway v. Conway, 14
Ill. 2d 461, 468, 453 N.E.2d 11, 15 (1958).
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that he acknowledge his signature to the witness. The testator must
merely acknowledge his will, and that he wishes the witnesses to sign. 106

Publication, required by 14 states, is defined as making it known in
the presence of witnesses that the instrument to be executed is the last
will and testament of the testator. 117 The testator's tacit acceptance of
someone else's statement that the instrument in question is the testator's

will also may constitute publication.0 8 In states requiring publication
lack of sufficient publication renders the will fatally defective. 0 9 It
seems indefensible for a will to be invalidated for failure to comply with

a formality that so minimally buttresses the reliability of the intended
testamentary transfer.

Closely related to the necessity of publication is the requirement in
13 states that the testator actually request the witness to attest the will.110
The request has little relation to the reliability of the will and is largely

unjustified. Fortunately, the courts have often implied the necessary request from other acts and statements of the testator. Implied requests

have been found where the witnesses signed with the testator's knowl2
edge and approval"' or with his consent.1
Proper witnessing is a universal condition precedent to the execution
of a valid will. All but one state require that a formal will be authenticated in writing by the signature of witnesses. 113 Two witnesses are
1 4
normally sufficient; in six states, however, three witnesses are needed.
106 2 W. BowE & D. PARKER § 19.116 (1960).

107In re MacVicar's Estate, 251 Iowa 1139, 1143, 104 N.W.2d 594, 597 (1960); In re
Estate of Moore, 166 Kan. 556, 561, 203 P.2d 192, 195 (1949); see appendix, p. 1394 infra.

Irrespective of whether publication is required, subscribing witnesses need not know
the contents of the will. See Wroblewski v. Yeager, 361 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Ky. 1962).
lO In re Petkos, 54 N.J. Super. 118, 148 A.2d 320 (App. Dep't 1959); Howard v.
Smith's Estate, 344 P.2d 260 (Okla. 1959). If because of the contents of the will the
witnesses are aware that the document is the testator's will, and if the witnesses see
him sign it or acknowledge his signature, this may be an effective publication. See Parkinson v. Artley, 93 Idaho 66, 455 P.2d 310 (1969).
109 In re Nevin's Will, 231 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Sur. Ct. 1962).
11o See appendix, p. 1394 infra.
111 Hollingswordt

v. Hollingsworth, 240 Ark. 582, 401 S.W.2d 555 (1966).

112Ritchey v. Jones, 210 Ala. 204, 97 So. 736 (1923); see Johnston v. King, 250 Ala.
571, 35 So. 2d 202 (1948).
113 The exception is Pennsylvania which does, however, require the will to be proved
by two competent witnesses. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.4 (Supp. 1970).
114 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-161 (1958); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1 (1964);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 191, § 1 (1958); N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 551:2 (Supp. 1971);
S.C. CODE ANli. § 19-205 (Cum. Supp. 1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5 (1958). The

validity of the will is not affected by attestation by more witnesses than required by
statute, even if one of the superfluous witnesses later is held to be unacceptable. See
Jones v. Brooks, 184 Ala. 115, 63 So. 978 (1913); Ducasse's Heirs v. Ducasse, 120 La.
731, 45 So. 565 (1908).
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A will attested by fewer than the required number of witnesses is not
valid. 115
Implicit in every wills statute is the requirement that a person, in
order to be an acceptable witness, must be competent. 1 6 Courts have
universally interpreted the statutory requirement of a competent witness to mean a person who, at the time of execution of the will, could
legally testify in court as to the facts of execution."17 Because of a common law belief that one with a financial interest in the matter tends to
give erroneous testimony, the rule evolved that a legatee or devisee under
a will cannot be a competent witness to the will. 118 The rule also applied where the witness was the spouse of a legatee or devisee." 9 The
result was that many wills were denied probate for lack of a sufficient
number of competent witnesses, which prompted England to enact the
first "purging" statute in 1752.120 Its effect was to void the testamentary
gift of a beneficiary who was also a necessary witness to a will. The
validity of the will thus was upheld by making the witness competent.
Today, most states have similar purging statutes which void testamentary gifts to witness-beneficiaries unless there are enough competent
witnesses without the attestation of the one financially interested in the
will.' 2 Most purging statutes also have saving clauses which allow a
witness-beneficiary who would have been an intestate successor to the
115 in re Poppe's Will, 60 Misc. 2d 418, 302 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Sur. Ct. 1969).
116 Many states use the term "credible" which is virtually synonymous with the term
competent. See In re Kent's Estate, 4 M1.2d 81, 85, 122 N.E.2d 229, 231 (1954); 2 W. BowE
& D. P aKERi § 19.79, at 179 & n.2.
117 See, e.g., Strahl v. Turner, 310 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1958); Fazekas v. Gobozy, 78
Ohio L. Abs. 258, 150 N.E.2d 319 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958); 2 W. Bowe & D. PMa § 19.79,
at 179-80. Most wills statutes do not have an age requirement for witnesses, and a minor
is considered an acceptable witness if he could testify to the facts of execution. See In re
Tannenbaum's Estate, 154 Misc. 828, 278 N.Y.S. 253 (Sur. Ct. 1935).
118Bruce v. Shuler, 108 Va. 670, 62 S.E. 973 (1908). Today a witness who has a
financial interest in the matter may testify, but his interest will affect his credibility. See
2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 576 (3d ed. 1940); 3a id. § 966. At common law the testator's
creditors were incompetent if the will specified that the debt be satisfied out of the
proceeds of the estate. 2 W. BowE & D. PARKER § 19.96, at 197. Since modern legislation
generally provides that the testator's debts are to be satisfied out of the proceeds of the
estate, the issue of a creditor's competency has been obviated. Id. at 198. Additionally,
many states expressly provide that creditors are competent witnesses. See appendix,
p. 1394 infra. A few statutes also declare that executors and other fiduciaries are competent to serve as witnesses. Id.
119 Fisher v. Spence, 150 Ill. 253, 37 N.E. 314 (1894).
120 Statute of George II, 25 Geo. 2, c. 6, (1752).
21
1 See appendix, p. 1394 infra. Ten states extend the effect of the purging statutes to
a witness whose spouse is a legatee or devisee. Id.
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decedent the equivalent of the witness's intestate share, up to the amount

12
actually bequeathed him in the will.
123
Witnesses must be competent at the time of execution of the will.

If a valid witness later acquires an interest subsequent to the execution
of the will, for example by marriage to a legatee, his competence is not
affected. 124 Conversely, if a witness is also a beneficiary under the will
at the time of execution, but releases his interest before probate of the
will, he is still incompetent.'25 The rationale is that the testator should
be protected at the time of execution by having financially disinterested

126
witnesses who are able to testify as to the facts of execution of the will.

The usual rule is that the witness is disqualified if he receives any direct benefit. 127 If the witness' benefit is indirect, the best rule is that the
testamentary interest must be one that results "in an appreciable pecuniary gain to the witness." 128 Special problems may arise where the witness is a parishioner or a club member or a taxpayer and the gift is to a
church, 1291 a club, 3 ' or a municipality. 13' Here, the witness is generally
held to be competent on the theory that his interest is not of direct
pecuniary benefit to him. 1 2
Anything that the witness intends to be his signature constitutes a
legally sufficient signing. 33 The witness' signature may appear anywhere
on the instrument.3 However, the paper that the witnesses sign must
be physically attached to the will.'35 More than just the mere physical
act of signing is required by law; the witness must intend to sign for the
purpose of validating the testamentary document. 36
122

Id.

123 See In re Kent's Estate, 4 Ill. 2d 81, 85, 122 N.E.2d 229, 231 (1954).
124ee Berndtson v. Heuberger, 21 IMI.
2d 557, 173 N.E.2d 460 (1961); In re Delavergne's
Will, 259 Ill. 589, 102 N.E. 1081 (1913).
125 Caesar v. Burgess, 103 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1939).
126 Holdfast d. Anstey v. Dowsing, 93 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B. 1746). It is usually
stated that witnesses are to attest to the mental capacity of the testator, as well as to the
facts of execution. Cf. Stormon v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475 (N.D. 1954).
127 In re Moody's Will, 155 Me. 325, 154 A.2d 165 (1959) (bequest of five dollars to
witnesses rendered them incompetent).
128 Appeal of Cox, 126 Me. 256, 259, 137 A. 771, 772 (1927).
129 In re Aiken's Estate, 103 Pa. Super. 279, 158 A. 190 (1932).
130 In re Ralston's Estate, 290 Pa. 374, 139 A. 129 (1927).
131 Hitchcock v. Shaw, 160 Mass. 140, 35 N.E. 671 (1893).
132 CoNN. GEN. STAT. Ax. § 45-172 (1960).
133 Cf. notes 85-93 supra and accompanying text.
134See In re Lomineck's Estate, 155 So. 2d 561 (Fla. App. 1963); Boren v. Boren, 394
S.W.2d 704, 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.
1966).
135 In re Panotasseris' Will, 2 Storey 21, 151 A.2d 518 (Del. Orphan's Ct. 1959).
135 Darmaby v. Halley's Ex'r, 306 Ky. 697, 208 S.W.2d 299 (1948).
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One other problem with regard to the signatures of the testator and
of the witnesses is the order of signing. Generally the testator's signing
precedes that of the witnesses. The difficulty arises where the witnesses
sign before the testator. Here, the majority American rule is that the
will is valid only if all the signings take place as part of one continuous
transaction. 13 7 Therefore, the testator's signature at some later time, not
contemporaneous with the earlier signings by the witnesses, vitiates the
entire will.3 8
One major formality of testamentary transfers is the requirement in
almost every state that the witnesses must sign the will in the presence of
the testator. 139 The avowed purpose of the rule is to prevent the witnesses
from fraudulently substituting another document in place of the testator's
will. 14 The requirement, however, is of questionable value in preventing
such fraud, particularly when balanced against the number of wills that
have been invalidated for failure to comply with his formality.
The difficulty lies in determining what constitutes compliance with
this requirement. The decisions generally have fallen into two categories:
cases which adhere to a strict standard of "presence" and those that follow the "conscious presence" rule. In jurisdictions applying a strict view
of presence, the testator must be in physical proximity to the witnesses
and be in such a position that he is able, if he wishes, to see both the will
and the witnesses in the act of signing it.14 ' If, for example, the witnesses
were in the next room, it would have to be proved as a question of fact
that the testator was situated physically so that he could have seen both
the will and the witnesses' signing of it.142
Many cases have not interpreted the presence requirement literally
and have followed a "conscious presence" rule in which the testator's
awareness of what is being done and his ability to hear the witnesses as
they attest is sufficient if all the signings are part of a single continuous
137 See In re Machay's Estate, 45 Ill. 122, 54 N.E. 901 (1899); Robertson v. Robertson,
232 Ky. 572, 574, 24 S.W.2d 282, 283 (1930).
138 In re McDonald's Will, 219 N.C. 209, 13 S.E.2d 239 (1941); In re Borgman's Estate,
61 Ohio L. Abs. 429, 105 N.E.2d 69 (Ct. App. 1951).
39
' See appendix, p. 1394 infra. A few states also require that the witnesses sign in the
presence of each other. See id. The same considerations apply to this situation as are
applicable to the requirement that witnesses sign in the presence of the testator.
140 See In re Weber's Estate, 192 Kan. 258, 263, 387 P.2d 165, 170 (1963).
141 Nichols v. Rowan, 422 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
142 See, e.g., In re Palmer's Estate, 255 Iowa 428, 122 N.W.2d 920 (1963) (testator and
witnesses in adjoining rooms; ability to see each other dependent on relative positions);
In re Weber's Estate, 192 Kan. 258, 387 P.2d 165 (1963) (testator sat in car while witnesses signed in bank window); Poindexter's Adm'r v. Alexander, 277 Ky. 147, 125
S.W.2d 981 (1939) (witnesses signed will in a room adjoining that of the bed-ridden
testatrix so that it was impossible for the testatrix to have observed the signing).
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transaction. 43 Conscious presence requires that the witnesses be.physically nearby and that the testator be cognizant of what is occirring. 4
-

Holograpbicwzlls.

Many states recognize that circumstances occasionally necessitate other, types of testamentary transfer and have dispensed with the usual formalities in certain limited situations.-One relaxation of formalities recognized in 19 states is the holographic will,
which is a testament entirely handwritten and signed by the testator.145
As a general rule, these statutes dispense with the requirements of attestation and other formalities of execution, provided, that' the will is
completely handwritten and signed by the testator. 14 1 In the remaining
states, the holographic nature of the will is immaterial, and all the formalities of ordinary wills must be met. In all of the states which recognize
holographic wills, such wills are subject to the usual rules of testamentary
capacity 4 7 and intent.148
The blind testator presents a special problem. Some cases have adhered to the sight
rule and have required that the blind testator be in such a position that he would have
been able to see the witnesses if he were not blind. Welch v. Kirby, 255 F. 451 (8th
Cir. 1918). However, it is preferable to allow the blind testator's other senses to substitute for his loss of sight. In re Allred's Will, 170 N.C. 153, 86 S.E. 1047 (1915).
143 In re Tracy's Estate, 80 Cal. App. 2d 782, 182 P.2d 336 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
144
In re Hoffman's Estate, 137 Cal. App. 2d 555, 290 P.2d 669 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955)
(witnesses and testator were separated by only a few feet and perhaps a partly closed
door); In re Lane's Estate, 265 Mich. 539, 251 N.W. 590 (1933) (witnesses signed in
corridor outside the testator's hospital room).
145 See appendix, p. 1400 n.23 infra.
146 Eight states also require that the testator date the will. See CAr.. PaOB. CODE § 53
(West 1956); LA. Cwv. CODE ANN. arts. 1574, 1588 (West 1952); MoNT. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 91-108 (1964); NEv. REv. STAT. 99 133.090, 136.190 (1967); N.D. REv. CODE § 56-0304
(Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. tir.'84, § 54 (1970); S.D. CODE § 29-2-8 (1967); UTAH- CODE
ANN. § 74-1-6 (1953). The date usually must be in the handwriting of the testator. In re
Estate of French, 225 Cal. App. 2d 9, 36 Cal. Rptr. 908 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964). If part of
the date is imprinted and the testator merely fills in the blanks, the will may be invalid. See Estate of Francis, 191 Cal. 600, 217 P. 746 (1923); In re Noyes' Estate, 40 Mont.
190, 105 P. 1017 (1909). But see In re Estate of Durlewanger, 41 Cal. App;-2d 750, 107
P.2d 477 (Dist. Ct. App. 1940), construing CAL. PROB. CODE § 53 (West 1956) (printed
matter not intended to be included in the will shall not invalidate-the will). A few decisions have involved the use of a shorthand date, such as 4/14/07 or 10/3/50. The former
is considered valid. See In re Estate of Chevallier, 159 Cal. 161, 170, 113 P. 130, 134
(1911). But the latter is invalid, because the date could mean either March.10 or October
3. See Succession of Mayer, 144 So. 2d 896 (La. App. 1962). An incomplete date renders
the will invalid. Estate of Hazelwood, 249 Cal. App. 2d 263, 57 Cal. Rptr. 332 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1967). But an incorrect date allows the will to be upheld. In re Estate of Moody,
118 Cal. App. 2d 300, 257 P.2d 709 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
147 See Succession of Turner, 157 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 1963); Carr v. Radkey, 393
S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1965).
148 Payne v. Rice, 210 Va.,514, 171 S.E.2d 826 (1970); In re Brigg's Estate, 148 W. Va.
294, 134 S.E.2d 737 (1964). Letters have been validated as holographic wills, provided the
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The basic requirement that a holographic will must be entirely in the
testator's handwriting serves an evidentiary purpose in the prevention
of fraud since holographic wills do not require witnesses. Yet, this formality has engendered a substantial amount of case law over what constitutes a completely handwritten document. A typewritten will signed
by the decedent is fatally defective as not being entirely in his handwriting.'1 9 Problems arise where the paper upon which the will is written contains printed, stamped, or typed language, or words written by
someone other than the testator. This situation sometimes arises where
the will is handwritten on hotel stationery, and the name and location
of the hotel are imprinted on the paper. If it appears that the non-holographic matter was neither included nor incorporated into the handwritten language, the will is valid. 150 Other cases have turned on the
question whether or not the testator intended the imprinted words to
be part of his will. If he did, the will is unacceptable;' if he did not
intend to include the imprinted words, the will, minus the non-holographic part, is valid.5 2 Other courts, more lenient in their treatment of
non-holographic matter, hold that such printed or stamped language is
immaterial, providing that the handwritten part is sufficient to constitute
a coherent testament. 5 3
In every state which permits holographic wills, the testator must sign
the document. The rules regarding the sufficiency of the testator's signature on a formal will are equally applicable to holographic wills, except
that no proxy signing should be allowed.' 5 ' In most states the testator's
requisite testamentary intent exists. See, e.g., In re Estate of Morris, 268 Cal. App. 2d 638,
74 Cal. Rptr. 32 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969); In re Estate of Wolfe, 260 Cal. App. 2d 587, 67
Cal. Rptr. 297 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968); In re Estate of Darms, 247 Cal. App. 2d 254, 55
Cal. Rptr. 463 (Dist. Ct.App. 1966).
149McNeill v. McNeill, 261 Ky. 240, 87 S.W.2d 367 (1935); Dean v. Dickey, 225
S.W.2d 999 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
150
In re Estate of Baker, 59 Cal. 2d 680, 381 P.2d 913, 31 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963); In re
Bennett's Estate, 324 P.2d 862 (Okla. 1958).
151In re Estate of Goldsworthy, 54 Cal. App. 2d 238, 17 Cal. Rptr. 716 (Dist. Ct.App.
1961).2
161n re Estate of Williams, 198 Cal. App. 2d 238, 17 Cal. Rptr. 716 (Dist. Ct. App.
1961).
153 Fairweather v. Nord, 388 S.W.2d 122 (Ky. 1965). One case went so far as to
validate a holographic will where only the dispositive portions and the signature were
written by hand in the blanks on a printed form. In re Parson's Will, 207 N.C. 584, 178
S.E. 78 (1935). See also UaNoRM PROBATE CODE § 2-503.
154 But in In re George's Estate the court stated by way of dictum, "It is ... settled
in Mississippi that holographic wills must be 'subscribed' by the testator or another for
him." 208 Miss. 734, 749, 45 So. 2d 571, 572 (1950). This appears to be a misinterpretation of the Mississippi statute which allowed the testator to dispense with attesting
witnesses only when the will is "wholly written and subscribed by himself or herself."

Miss. CODE AiNN. § 657 (Recomp. Vol. 1956) (emphasis added).
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signature anywhere on the holographic will is permissible, as long as it

appears that the writing represents a complete will.'
THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE AND THE
EXECUTION OF FORMAL AND HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS

Section 2-502 of the Uniform Probate Code states:
Except as provided for holographic wills, writings within Section
2-513,156 and wills within Section 2-506,157 every will shall be in
writing signed by the testator or in the testator's name by some
other person in the testator's presence and by his direction, and
shall be signed by at least 2 persons each of whom witnessed. either
the signing or the testator's acknowledgment of the signature or
of the will.'5"
Pursuant to its policy of validating wills whenever possible, the Uzi-

form Probate Code has reduced the formalities of execution to a minimum. 159 A testator's signature, plus the signatures of two witnessesW160
15 In re Jones' Estate, 44 Tenn. App. 323, 314 S.W.2d 39 (1957); see In re Estate of
Phippen, 238 Cal. App. 2d 241, 41 Cal. Rptr. 648 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (will was upheld
where the only signature was at the end of the first six of twelve testamentary pages).
A few states, for example Kentucky, require signature at the end of the will. See Fairweather v. Nord, 388 S.W.2d 122 (Ky. 1965).
156 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the concept of incorporation by
reference. However, section 2-513 of the Uniform Probate Code, by adding a new
dimension to the law of wills, should be mentioned. This section is part of the basic
attempt of the Code to insure effectuation of the testator's intent and at the same time
relax the formalities of execution. Section 2-513 permits a testator to dispose of certain
items of tangible personal property by referring to a separate document which contains his testamentary disposition and which may be prepared after the execution of his
will and which may be altered from time to time. The only requirement is that the
writing be in the testator's handwriting or be signed by the testator.
157 Section 2-506 enunciates the Code's choice of law rule as to execution and therefore will become of only minimal importance once the Code is uniformly adopted
throughout the United States. Section 2-506 provides that a will which does not meet
the requirements of section 2-502 or section 2-503 is nevertheless valid if it is valid at
the time it is executed under the law of the place of execution. In addition, it makes
provision for validating a will in the code state if the will had been validly executed
according to the law of the place where the testator is domiciled, has an abode, or is
a national either at the time of execution or at the time of his death.
158 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-502.

159 Id. Part 5 General Comment.
160 The Code simplifies the law relating to the competency of witnesses: "Any person
generally competent to be a witness may act as a witness to a will." Id. § 2-505. An interested witness is no longer disqualified, nor is a gift to an interested witness invalidated
or forfeited. The Comments to Section 2-505 state that permitting interested witnesses
to testify and retain their bequest will not increase the opportunity for fraud. The law
of undue influence sufficiently safeguards against fraud and illegality. However, to avoid
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usually will satisfy the requirements of execution. There are, however,
some problems in the concept of witnessing. The Code Comments to
section 2-502 state that, "[e] ach of the persons signing as witnesses must

'witness' any of the following: the signing of the will by the testator,
an acknowledgment by the testator that the signature is his, or an acknowledgment by the testator that the document is his will." But there
is no definition of the term witness in the Code. In fact, the Comment
to section 2-502 declares that, "[t]here is no requirement ... that the

witnesses sign in the presence of the testator or of each other." Conceivably a testator could sign his will and acknowledge this fact by telephone to two friends and then mail them the will for their signatures as
witnesses, and still comply with the terms of the Code. If this is correct,

the possibility of fraud or substitution of the wrong document would
render unreliable the document being offered for probate. In this same
context, the Code would negate the basic policy of the Statute of Frauds.
The only Code language that may prevent such interpretation is the
word "witnessed." In the absence of further definition, a court confronted with this problem probably would look to state law to interpret
what constitutes the act of witnessing, as that term is used in section 2502. However, some form of presence is expressly required by every
state statute, 161 and therefore the Code's elimination of the presence requirement will limit the applicability of state law. It would be preferable
to require that the witnessing of the testator's signature, or the testator's
acknowledgment of the signature or of the will itself be done in the testator's conscious presence.
The Code retains the universal requirement that the will be in writing
and sigied by the testator. The Code specifically states that signing by
mark, or by another on behalf of the testator, provided that person is
acting at the direction of the testator and in his presence, constitutes a
valid signature. 162 The necessity of publication, a formality which only
minimally has served to buttress the reliability of intended testamentary
transfers, has been deleted. Nor is there a requirement in the Code of a
request to witnesses. If the testator signs outside the presence of the witnesses, later he merely must acknowledge that the signature is his or that
the document is his will, and have them sign as witnesses. Finally, the
testator need not sign the will at the end. A signature in the body of the
will, which is intended to constitute execution, would satisfy the Code.'
even the appearance of impropriety, the continued use by attorneys of disinterested
Witnesses is recoimended.
1 61
See appendix, p. 1394 infra.
2
16 UNORM PROBATE CoDE § 2-502, Comment.
'163 Id.
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If the Code has reduced the formalities of execution of an ordinary
will to a minimum, the safeguards required of a holographic will have
been virtually obliterated. Section 2-503 declares that "[a] will which
does not comply with Section 2-502 is valid as a holographic will,
whether or not witnessed, if the signature and the material provisions
are in the handwriting of the testator." 164 The usual requirements that
the holographic will be entirely handwritten and dated are eliminated,
as of course, is the need for attestation. All that is necessary now is that
the testator sign and that the material provisions be in his handwriting.
In evaluating the section governing holographic wills two basic policies-maximum opportunity to execute a will and testamentary safeguards-collide. The Code's rationale is that "[f]or persons unable to
obtain legal assistance, the holographic will may be adequate." 165 The
importance of this policy hardly could be overstated. However, safeguards have been reduced to the point where testamentary intent may
itself be in question and where opportunities for fraud abound. Nevertheless, the Code policy favoring maximum testamentary freedom is more
significant and should be effectuated.
Although the Code may be criticized because of problems raised by
the failure to explain what constitutes witnessing and because of the
drastic reduction of holographic will safeguards, these criticisms are
relatively minor and are far outweighed by the benefits to be gained
from universal adoption of the Code. Many of the common law requirements of testamentary transfer are outmoded or no' longer serve a valid
function and should be eliminated. Other formalities make the execution
of a will unduly complicated, and the strict enforcement of some requirements results in the denial of probate to many wills. Finally, in view
of the tremendous mobility of modern society, uniformity and consistency in the formalities of testamentary transfer certainly are desirable.
PROTECTION OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE

The desire to protect a surviving spouse from disinheritance and concomitant destitution has produced some of the major limitations on the
general policy favoring freedom of testation. The purpose of this section of the article is to evaluate the need for protection of the surviving
spouse, to describe the various forms that such protections have taken
prior to the advent of the Uniform Probate Code, and to analyze the
extreme changes wrought by the Code.166
164 Id. § 2-503.
165 Id. § 2-503 & Comment.

166 It should be noted that most of the methods of protecting the surviving spouse
discussed herein apply to the widower as well as the widow.
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COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY PROTECTION

Dower.
English-speaking peoples first began to respond to the
plight of the disinherited spouse in feudal times. Since land was the principal wealth, it was decided that a widow should be entitled to a onethird life interest in all lands of which her husband was seised during
the marriage. 67 The wife's interest dated from the time of the marriage
and included all lands acquired during the conjugal relationship. The
dower interest was inchoate in that it existed before a husband's death
but did not become a possessory interest unless and until she survived
her husband. The inchoate interest remained attached to the land even
if the husband were to transfer it to another. The wife's claim could be
exercised against beneficiaries or creditors of the estate, irrespective of
the creditors' knowledge of the existence of the interest.' The wife's
interest became consummate on the death of her husband. 6 9 One-third
of the estate would be set off and she could live on that land and derive
the benefits which arose from it. If this were impractical, the widow
would receive one-third of the income produced by the land for her life.
Common law dower's major drawback was its exclusive applicability
to land. 170 Since our present system of wealth is oriented far more towards intangible property, such as stocks, bonds and cash, dower is now
of limited assistance to the disinherited spouse. Moreover, today's investments in land are often in such a form as to be treated as personalty and
therefore are not subject to dower.
Another drawback to the effectiveness of dower is the ease with
which the inchoate interest can be lost by the wife's "voluntary" relinquishment of her right. The inchoate power to veto a transfer in lands
167 See T. ATKrNsoN 104-05; 2 Powmar. ON REAL PROPERTY

209, at 140 (1971). Curtesy,

a device similar to dower, entitled the husband to possession or profits of all lands
of which his wife was seised during marriage, dependent upon the birth of issue. T. ATmNsoN 105.
168 2 PowErT, supra note 167,

202 [2], at 154-55; 1 C. SCRIMNEm, TmTiSa

oNr
NaH LAW

OF DOWER 602 (1883). In Westfall v. Hintze, the defendant applied to plaintiff for a
mortgage and represented that he was unmarried. When plaintiff attempted to foreclose, the court held that the wife's dower interest was superior to that of the mortgagee,
despite the fraud. 7 Abb. N. Cas. 236 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1878).
169 At common law there wag a presumption that unless otherwise specified, bequests
in the will were in addition to dower. However, a husband could compel his widow
to choose between a provision in the will and her dower interest. Stevenson, Does Dower
Still Lurk in Election to Take Under the Will?, 30 U. GIN. L. REv. 172, 176 (1961).
170 Note, Perfection of the Spouse's Share under Elective Share Statutes, 18 VAND. L.
REv. 2090, 2091 (1968). The Statute of Distribution in 1670 gave the widow a share in
her husband's personalty. 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10 (1670). But this interest could be avoided
by inter vivos transfer and was also subject to the husband's creditors. T. AmaTNsoN 105,
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also can be a serious impediment to the sale of realty. 171 The failure to

accomplish the purpose for which it was created and the impediment
to real estate transactions have caused most states to abolish dower enpersonalty, or to enact statutes providing
tirely, to modify it to include
72
share.
forced
for a minimum
The right of elecThe Forced Share and the Right of Election.
and take in its
spouse
a
deceased
of
will
the
renounce
to
right
is
the
tion
stead a statutory percentage of the estate, usually one-third or one-half
of the net probate assets, both real and personal. 7 3 In most jurisdictions
the election must be made within a specified time period, be in writing,
and be filed with the court having jurisdiction.174
The forced share is quite different from dower. In the first place, it
operates on all real and personal property which make up a decedent's
probate estate. Secondly, the wife's interest in the property does not
exist until the death of her husband. The "inchoate" aspect of dower
is absent and the property owner, within limits, can dispose of it during
his life.'75 Unlike dower, creditors are generally superior to the statutory
share of the surviving spouse. Finally, the widow has a fee interest in the
property rather than the life interest she receives under a dower system.
This makes valuation of her interest simpler, protects her from claims
of waste by a remainderman, eases alienability of the property, and increases the market value of her interest. On its face the forced share
seems to be an efficient and adequate means of protecting the surviving
spouse. The widow is given what in most instances is a greater interest,
she is given it outright, and the potential inhibition of land transactions
is eliminated. The husband who wishes to disinherit his wife and leave
his property to others seemingly is thwarted.
171 Dower rights cloud the title of every piece of land that has been owned by a
married person. Expensive tide searches are complicated by problems such as the exact
date of a marriage or the validity of a divorce. M. RHEiNsTErN, CAsEs ON DECEDENT'S
EsrATEs 67 (1955).
172 Dower has been retained in 15 states and modified in eight states to grant a fee
interest rather than a life estate. Two states, North Dakota and South Dakota, have
eliminated all protection of the spouse. The remaining states give the surviving spouse
a fixed percentage of the entire estate. 1 W. BowE & D. P~AKuR S 3.13, at 97.
173 Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U.
Cur. L. Rgv. 681, 682 (1966); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1963); Ky. Rgv. STAT. § 392.080
(1970); MnNm. SrAT. ANN. § 525.145 (1969). Often the share is equivalent to the amount
the spouse would receive had the assets passed through intestacy. See ARK. STAT. ANN.
S 60-501 (1971).
174 ABA Comm. ON SuccFssIoN, REPORT, ELECnoN BY THE SURVIVING SpousE, in 2 RE.AL
PRoP.PROB. &TRusr J. 310, 312, 313 (1967).
175 See notes 178-181 infra and accompanying text.
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However, the forced share met a fate similar to that of many new
laws. No sooner was it a part of a state's decedents' estates law than attorneys began to find ways for their clients to get around it. The key
to the avoidance of a forced share statute is that only the assets which
pass through the formal probate estate are subject to the statute's reach.
Therefore, assets transferred by way of any one of several will substitutes
would not be included in the source from which the surviving spouse's
election is made. There is a plethora of will substitutes available for this
purpose. 7 6 Joint property with right of survivorship passes the property
by operation of law to the surviving joint tenant, bypassing the surviving
spouse. Life insurance passes directly to the named beneficiary by means
of contract and never becomes part of the assets of the estate. Savings
bank trusts or Totten trusts pass directly to the beneficiary assets remaining in the bank account after the depositor's death; the depositor
retains control over the property and can withdraw any or all of the
funds at any time. Yet what remains at his death may elude the reach of
his surviving spouse. This is the common thread in all substitutes: the
husband can deplete his estate, and leave nothing against which to assert
the election.
Finally, the most significant method of statutory share avoidance is
the use of the revocable or irrevocable inter vivos trust. Those who
heeded the warning in King Lear not to part entirely with their wealth
nevertheless can enjoy most of the benefits of their property and still
circumvent the forced share. Assets are placed in trust, and the husband
retains a life interest in all income and the power to invade corpus. At
his death the principal is distributed. The surprised widow learns that
she is not the trust beneficiary and that the assets do not make up part
of her late husband's probate estate. Before the advent of certain state
legislation and of the Uniform Probate Code the widow's only hope
was to call upon the courts to prevent avoidance of her statutory share.
The courts have attempted to help but with mixed success.
The major case which seeks to protect the widow's share is Neu-man
v. Dore.177 Three days before his death, a wealthy testator transferred
all of his real and personal property to a trust over which he retained
the right to income, the power of revocation, and control over the
trustees. The New York Court of Appeals ruled that the transfer was
176 See Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: A Proposal for Reform, 52 GEo. L.J.
499, 503 (1964); Plager, supra note 173, at 692, 693, 695-96.
177 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
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"illusory"-the testator had not made an actual divestiture of the proper17
ty because he retained too much control over the corpus of the trust.

8

Other courts, however, have found the illusory transfer test difficult to
administer. Opinions are inconsistent as to what transfers were illusory
and which were not. The New York court had framed the standard
in objective terms, but evidence of the testator's intent and state of mind
crept into opinionsY79 Some courts have refused to adopt the illusory
transfer standard and instead use a "fraud or intent" test. Under this
standard any transfer made with the intent to deprive the widow of her
share constitutes a fraud.8 0 The burden of proof under this standard is
difficult to meet, and guidelines are necessarily difficult to apply; thus
many courts have decided cases on the fairness of the transfer.181 The
majority rule still remains that even if the purpose of an inter vivos transtransfer
fer is to deprive the surviving spouse of her statutory share, the
82
is valid if it is an actual transfer of an interest in the property.
In the United States, community properCommunity Property.
ty is a statutory creature which has been adopted in differing forms by
eight states.'83 Despite the differences which do exist, community property laws in the United States are similar to the type developed in Spain.
178 1d. at 381, 9 N.E.2d at 969. The court also held that the intent to disinherit was
not relevant to the decision. Id. at 379, 9 N.E.2d at 968.
179 Compare Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945) (testator placed
property in name of child with stipulation that child held property for him) and Edgar
v. Fitzpatrick, 377 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1964) (gift in trust to children of prior marriage
but settlor retained all incidents of ownership) and Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio
St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944) (settlor reserved income and right to revoke or amend)
with Allender v. Allender, 199 Md. 541, 87 A.2d 608 (1952) (settlor transferred stock in
trust to children but continued to vote shares and receive dividends; held not illusory).
180 See, e.g., Mushaw v. Mushaw, 183 Md. 511, 39 A.2d 465 (1944); Merz v. Tower
Grove Bank & Trust Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W.2d 611 (1939); Harmm v. Piper, 105
N.H. 418, 201 A.2d 125 (1964); Sherrill v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798 (Tenn. App. 1967).
See also Payne v. Tatum, 236 Ky. 306, 33 S.W.2d 2 (1930) (if a substantial portion of
an estate is placed in trust without wife's knowledge there is presumption of improper
motive). Some courts have required actual fraudulent intent, which is more than mere
intent to deprive the widow of her share. See Frey v. Wubbena, 26 In. 2d 62, 185 N.E.2d
850 (1962); In re Rynier's Estate, 347 Pa. 471, 32 A.2d 736 (1943); De Noble v. De Noble,
331 Pa. 273, 200 A. 77 (1938).
181 Factors to consider in determining whether the transfer was completed with
fraudulent intent include: the size of the transfer in relation to the total assets of the
estate; the time of the transfer in relation to the husband's death; relations between
husband and wife at the time of the-transfer; and the source of the property. Sherrill v.
Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tenn. App. 1967).
182 See, e.g., Holzbeierlein v Holzbeierlein, 91 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Kerwin v.
Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945); In re Estate of Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183,
130 N.W.2d 473 (1960).
183 California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington.
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In general, the husband and the wife become co-owners of property acquired by either during their marriage as a result of their labor or industry.8 4 Property owned individually before the marriage and property
received as a result of a gift, bequest, or devise to only one of the spouses
is unaffected by community property laws and retains the characteristics
of individually owned property. 85 The co-ownership operates as a conjugal partnership with managerial responsibilities in the husband.' 6 Community property cannot be given away without the consent of both
partners and upon the death of a marriage partner, one-half passes directly to the spouse and the other half according to the will of the decedent.'87 Thus, each spouse is assured of receiving the financial security
inherent in ownership of one-half of the family's assets.
Despite a presumption that property is held by the community, a loophole exists in the system. Property acquired through labor and industry
by one partner while domiciled in a non-community property state may
remain under separate ownership when the couple moves to a community property state.' 8 A second major defect in the community property
system is that property inherited by one spouse is not considered the
community property of both.8 9 As a result, in a family which depends
upon the income derived from inherited property, a spouse is left with
little community property from which to derive her share. Some states
have ameliorated this problem by providing that income derived from
inherited property during the marriage is community property despite
the fact that the source of the income derives solely from one spouse.
These problems are indicative that community property does not provide air tight protection for the surviving spouse. However, as a result
of resistance on the part of representatives from community property
states, the provisions of the -Uniform Probate Code dealing with the
elective share of a surviving spouse will not apply in those states.'
Major Statutory Reforms Before the Uniform Probate Code.
In 1947 the state of Pennsylvania took steps to close holes existing in
W. BowE &D. PARKER § 16.9, at 778.
185 Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Interspousal Transactions, 19
BAYLOR L. REv. 20, 26 (1967).
186 Note, Protection of the Family Against DisinheritanceIn American Law, 14 IrrIL
& Coxe. L.Q. 293, 296-97 (1965).
187 Phipps, MaritalProperty Interests, 27 RocKY MT. L. Rnv. 180, 187 (1955).
188 Stephen v. Stephen, 36 Ariz. 235, 284 P. 158 (1930); Rau v. Rau, 6 Ariz. App. 362,
432 P.2d910 (Ct. App. 1967).
189 Vaughn, supranote 185, at 57.
190 See UNiFoRm PROBATE CoDE, Part 2, General Comment; notes 201-221 infra and
accompanying text.
1841
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forced share legislation. Pennsylvania enacted a deceptively simple piece
of legislation: to the extent that a transferor has retained a power of
revocation or consumption over the principal or a power of appointment over the corpus of the trust, the surviving spouse may treat that
transfer as testamentary and include it among the assets against which
she may assert her election.' 9 ' The statute applies to all trusts except those
whose corpus is composed of an insurance policy. 92 Assets in fact received by a spouse through testamentary substitutes are not credited
193
against the spouse's share.
Unfortunately the simplicity of the statute has been its major drawback. A good deal of litigation has arisen in attempts to clarify the meaning of phrases such as "conveyance of assets" or "power of consumption." 1 From the existing litigation, future cases likely will turn on the
technical nature of the transfer involved. For example, a wife may suecessfully go against a joint tenancy because her husband has the power
of consumption over it. But, where a husband has retained only the
right to income from a trust he has created and the principal is beyond
his control, the transfer is insulated from attack. By permitting form to
dominate substance Pennsylvania's attempted reform falls short of the
mark.
The New York statute'95 is more complicated and more effective than
its Pennsylvania counterpart. Under New York law, the widow is permitted to elect against her husband's will and claim a percentage of what
the New York legislators have termed the net estate. 196 This net estate
is composed of all probate assets plus the capital value of the following
substitutes: a gift causa mortis; a Totten trust created in any bank or
savings and loan association, domestic or foreign, on deposit at death; a
joint savings account plus all dividends credited thereon at the time of
death; property in joint tenancy or tenancy by entirety with rights of
survivorship to the extent that the funds were supplied by the decedent;
and property placed in trust over which the decedent retained either
alone or in conjunction with another the power to revoke the trust or
to consume or invade the principal. 197 The net estate does not include,
inter alia, life insurance, pension plans, annuities, health insurance, and
19, PA. STAT. ANIw. tit. 20, § 301.11 (a) (1950).

192 Life insurance specifically was excluded by a later amendment to the. statute. 7d. 193 In re Scheller's Estate, 31 Fayette Legal J. 14 (Fayette Co., Pa. Orphan's Ct. 1968).
194 See In re Killion's Trust, Pa. D. & C.2d 101 (1964); Longacre v. Hornblower &
Weeks, 83 Pa. D. & C. 259 (1954).
195 N.Y. DEC. Esr. LAw § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1966).
196 Id.
197 Id. § 5-1.1(b) (1).
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U.S. savings bonds. Additionally, if a wife is the beneficiary of any testamentary substitute other than life insurance, that property is counted
against her share in computing the net estate. 1 8
The New York statute, to a great extent, accomplishes its purpose and
closes the holes in forced share legislation. Avoidance, however, is still
possible through conversion of the husband's assets into insurance, annuities, pensions or savings bonds. Furthermore, the husband could transfer his property in trust retaining the right to income and giving the
power to invade principal to a friendly but technically adverse party.
These are rather small loopholes but they prevent the New York law
from being a completely satisfactory solution. 9
With a few exceptions, existing methods for protecting the spouse
from disinheritance have been rather ineffective. The law of wills is still
haunted by the spectre of the disinherited widow left out in the cold
by a cruel and heartless spouse. °0
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

Part 2 or article 2 of the Uniform Probate Code, entitled "Elective
Share of Surviving Spouse" is a massive legislative undertaking designed
to solve the problem of securing to the surviving spouse a proper share
of the decedent's estate. The response to two policy questions underlies
the Code's solution. The first is whether a need actually exists for uniform legislation to protect against the decedent's disinheritance of his
surviving spouse. The Code recognizes that commentators have questioned such a need and responds by pointing out that nearly every state
offers some form of protection to the surviving spouse. The existing
forms of protection-dower, statutory share, community property and
the miscellaneous individual state legislative solutions-all have their
shortcomings. Yet, to merely cite the prevalence of such protective devices really does not answer the question of the need for them. A higher
degree of justification should be required for an infringement of freedom of testation. Furthermore, disinheritance of surviving spouses is an
infrequent occurrence.2 1 However, the need for effective protection of
198 Id. § 5-1.1 (b) (2).
199 Missouri and Vermont have also attempted to prevent fraud on the widow's share.
See Mo. REv. STAT. § 474.160-290 (1956); VT.STAT. Am. §§ 401-09 (1958). See also
MODEL PROBATE CODE §
200

33.

See Haskell, supra note 176, at 508.
201 A recent study of probate proceedings in Cook County, Illinois, concluded that
when there was a surviving spouse, 27 out of 28 wills left the entire estate to the spouse.
Plager, supra note 173, at 712. But another commentator has concluded that although
presently the number of evasion cases is not large, the number is likely to increase,
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the surviving spouse, as a societal matter, outweighs infringement upon
the individual decedent's power to transfer his -property as he pleases.
Disinheritance of the surviving spoulse is like leprosy; it may not occur
often, but when it does its treatment is crucial.
The second policy issue is to determine the quantity of the surviving
spouse's share. The choices are either to give to the surviving spouse an
amount sufficient to meet that person's personal needs or to make the
elective share a percentage of the decedent's assets. The Code utilizes
the percentage method both because it is the traditional answer and because determining the needs of the surviving spouse would be difficult to
forecast and to administer. 2 2 Close judicial supervision of every case
would be required.1° Moreover, questions of subjective versus objective
needs arise, the answers to which inevitably would lead to political and
social matters far more significant than the original questions themselves.
The concern with the size of the elective share also relates back to
the marital situation itself. The concept of married persons owning, enjoying and using their property in concert should be encouraged. Concerted ownership necessarily raises factors of reliance and expectation
during the marriage, which should be buttressed by statute. The Code's
traditional view in meeting this concern is well founded. The answer to
the problem of the amount of the spouse's share is and should be a reasonable proportion of the decedent's assets.
The Code proposes a significantly new approach to the problem of
the surviving spouse's share. Section 2-201204 establishes the right to an
elective share for any married person whose predeceased spouse was
domiciliary of the state. The elective share of the surviving spouse is set
largely as a result of an increase in family disharmony. W. MAcDoNALD, FaAuro ON THE
WIDow's SHARE 8 n.9, 10-15 (1960).
202 In England, if the court is of the opinion that the will did not make reasonable
provision for the maintenance of a surviving spouse, periodic payments in an amount
designated by the court may be ordered. Inheritance (Family Provision) Act of 1938,
1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 45. However, the maintenance provisions require that the court familiarize itself with the decedent's estate and his family affairs, and that it exercise great
discretion in determining the spouse's needs. Plager, supra note 173, at 683.
203 See Clark, The Recapture of Testamentary Substitutes to Preserve the Spouse's
Elective Share: An Appraisal of Recent Statutory Reforms, 2 CoNN. L. REv. 513, 543
(1970).
204 "If a married person domiciled in this state dies, the surviving spouse has a right
of election to take an elective share of one-third of the augmented estate under the
limitations and conditions hereinafter stated." Uuomv PRoBATE CODE § 2-201(1).
Whether or not the surviving spouse elects against the will, she is entitled to homestead,
family allowances and exempt property. 2 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE NoiTs 7 (Oct., 1972).
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at one-third of the decedent's augmented estate, offset by property derived from the decedent.
Section 2-202, the key section dealing with the spouse's share, defines
the augmented estate. The foundation of the augmented estate is the net
probate estate to which isadded the value of property transferred for
less than full consideration by the decedent while married, where such
transfers did not benefit the surviving spouse. All of this applies only to
transfers to which at least one of the following classifications is applicable: (1) the decedent retained possession, enjoyment or right to
income from the transferred property; (2) the decedent, alone or in
conjunction with another person, retained the power to revoke or to
use or allocate principal; (3) retention by the decedent and another
person at the time of decedent's death of a survivorship right in transferred property; or (4) any transfer made by decedent within two years
of his death to any one donee in excess of $3,000 in either of said two
years.20 5 By adding back into the augmented estate property transferred

inter vivos by the decedent where he retained benefit from or control
over the assets, the Code's purpose is to thwart the decedent's deliberate
attempt to use will substitutes in order to defeat the elective share of
his surviving spouse. The testator still can use outright transfers, such
as gifts or irrevocable trusts with no retained benefits to deplete the
estate and thus to reduce the elective share, but this is less likely to
occur where the transferor keeps neither benefit nor control of the
transferred assets.
Another large category of property included in the augmented estate
is property derived from the decedent in any way other than by inheritance, owned by the surviving spouse at the time of the decedent's
2
death, and for which the survivor gave less than full consideration. 11
This property, even if no longer owned by the surviving spouse at the
time of the decedent's death, is includable in the decedent's augmented
estate if the property has been transferred by the surviving spouse in
such a way as to be a part of the survivor's augmented estate had the
survivor died first. 2 17 In effect, the Code includes in the decedent's aug-

mented estate the value of any property given by the decedent to his
surviving spouse.2 18 Property thus acquired then becomes a credit against
205 U

FoiRa

PROBATE CODE § 2-202(1).

But any transfer made with the written con-

sent of the spouse is valid. Id. § 2-202(2).
206 Id. § 2-202(3).
207 Id. § 2-202 (3) (ill).
208 The Code does not distinguish between gifts and property the surviving spouse
acquired in the form of support payments, household goods, or necessaries. See Clark,
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the elective share.209 The Code's purpose here is to prevent the surviving
spouse from electing a share of the probate estate when the spouse has
received a fair share of the total wealth of the decedent either during
the lifetime of the decedent or at death by life insurance, joint tenancy
210
assets and other nonprobate arrangements.
For example, assume that the decedent's probate assets after payment
of all debts and taxes amount to $80,000. This net probate estate is called
the x factor. Decedent's will leaves his net estate to his brother. Assume
further that the decedent and his brother held property worth $40,000
in joint ownership with right of survivorship. The joint property will
substitute (or perhaps evasion element) will be called the y factor. Finally, assume that the surviving spouse receives, upon the death of her husband and because of premiums paid by him, life insurance proceeds in
the amount of $30,000. This property derived from the decedent will
be called the z factor. The Code formula is as follows:
1
214
Elective share Y/3211 W 12 ± y2 13 + z ) - e 6
'%($80,000 + $40,000 + $30,000) - $30,000
-

-

The elective share is $20,000 and the survivor keeps the life insurance
proceeds. Therefore, the surviving spouse will take a total of $50,000.
Had the decedent also named his brother as beneficiary of the life
insurance, the result in the example should be the same, but itis not.21 6
Section 2-202 excludes life insurance from the y factor, the category of
transfers to other persons.2 17 Further, any transfer to which the surviving
spouse consents in writing is also excluded from the augmented estate.
Finally, the right of election is personal to the surviving spouse218 and
219
may be waived either before or after marriage.
supra note 203, at 543 n.81. Nor does the Code distinguish between transfers made before or after marriage. See UNEooRm PROBATE CODE § 2-202, Comment.
2

09 UNWORM PROBATE CODE § 2-207 (a).
Id. § 2-202, Comment.

210

211 Id. § 2-201.
212 Id. § 2-202.
213 Id. § 2-202 (1) (iii).
214 Id. § 2-202 (3) (i).
215 Id. § 2-207.

of ($80,000 + $40,000) = $40,000.
payable to the surviving spouse are considered property
derived from the decedent and are included in the equation as the z factor. UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE § 2-202, Comment.
218 Id. § 2-203 and Part 2, General Comment.
219 Id. § 2-204. The provision permitting waiver is desirable so that parties to a second
or third marriage can insure that property derived from a prior spouse will pass to the
issue of the prior spouse rather than to the new spouse. Id. § 2-204, Comment.
216 Wife will take one-third
217 Life insurance proceeds
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Perhaps the provision in the Code that will give state legislatures the
most concern is the contribution section. The Code mandates that gratuitous transferees of property subject to the spouse's elective share are
liable, pro rata, for contribution to make up that elective share.220 While
potentially troublesome, no better way of enforcing the elective share
of the surviving spouse is apparent.
In evaluating the Uniform Probate Code's new approach to the problem of the elective share of the surviving spouse, it is interesting to note
that the Code's introductory Comment admits that, "almost every feature of the system described herein is or may be controversial." Professor Clark writes that, "it appears that the authors did not approach
their work with full confidence in the enterprise." 221 In the course of
arguing that the elective share statute should not be adopted, Clark goes
on to say that ".... in the end the Code provisions are fatally deficient,
as are those of New York and Pennsylvania, because every family presents a different set of problems and no single prescription can cure them
all." 222 The new system will indeed be controversial and will engender
a great deal of discussion, as well it should. But in the final analysis, the
Uniform Probate Code should be adopted.
Legislation is needed to protect the surviving spouse from disinheritance. The "every family has a different set of problems" rationale could
be used to argue against nearly every piece of legislation. Since past
efforts to protect the surviving spouse have been shown to be inadequate,
the drafters of the Code have tried to close the loopholes and they have
come closer than anyone else. At the same time, by adding into the augmented estate and then crediting against the elective share the value of
property that the surviving spouse has derived from the decedent, the
Code strikes an important balance between protection of the surviving
spouse and preventing elections where the survivor already has gotten
a fair share of the deceased partner's assets. For this reason alone, legislatures should be receptive to this section of the Code.
To be sure, the Uniform Probate Code has flaws. When calculating
the augmented estate life insurance is excluded from a transfer made by
the decedent to other persons which is a clear invitation to a testator
determined to avoid his spouse's elective share. Another potential problem is the release factor. Coerced waiver of dower rights is a major defect in existing systems, and the same problem is possible under the Code.
Some further requirement such as noticing or witnessing a waiver would
220 Id. §§ 2-205(d), 2-207.
221 Clark, supra note 203,

222 Id. at 542.

at 541-42.
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be a salutary protection. Overly complex problems will arise because of
the Code's presumption under section 2-202 (3) (iii) which makes it
necessary for the surviving spouse to establish that the property in quesnon was derived from another source rather than from the decedent,
and places the burden of proof on the surviving spouse.
The answer to the charge that the Code will produce massive administrative problems lies in the Pennsylvania and New York experiences
to the contrary. The Code's authors believe that, ". . . it should not
complicate administration of a married person's estate in any but very

unusual cases."
In closing, it should be reiterated that the entire subject of the surviving spouse's elective share is difficult, subtle and permits of no easy
solution.223 The matter needs careful study by the several state legislatures now considering the Uniform Probate Code. One vote aye, here.

223 In a recent speech in New York, Professor Richard Wellman, one of the principal

authors of the UNnouRm POBATE CODE commented: "it would not have been possible
from a political point of view, to offer a uniform probate code to replace existing state
schemes without including provisions to replace existing probate devices for protecting
spouses. So [the drafters] had to frame a scheme that we knew would be unsatisfactory
from many points of view." 4 UmnwoRM PROBATz CoDE NoTEs 3 (March, 1973). It is
unfortunate that the drafters view their solution to the problem of the protection of the
surviving spouse with a negative attitude:
'Faint heart never won fair lady!
P
Nothing venture, nothing win -W. S. Gilbert, Iolanthe, Act II
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